Animals and Man Essay -- Analysis, G.W. Leibniz

G.W. Leibniz asserts that humans are superior to all other creatures. Admittedly, Leibniz’s ideas on this matter are somewhat ambiguous, making it difficult to ascertain his exact position. In some instances within the Discourse on Metaphysics, he appears to hold that animals do not have souls. On other occasions, however, he seems to express beliefs to the contrary. For example, Leibniz first expresses doubt about souls of animals when he questions â€Å"if they [animals] have any [souls]† (Leibniz, 11). In another example, on the contrary, he hints that â€Å"the souls †¦ of other bodies are entirely different from intelligent souls† (12). This gives the impression that both other bodies and humans (â€Å"intelligent souls†) have souls albeit different to some degree. Later, however, Leibniz definitively remarks â€Å"that animals have souls† (37). In The Monadology, any remaining uncertainty vanishes. Here, he first mentions that â €Å"nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to furnish them organs †¦Ã¢â‚¬  (71). Then, a few words later Leibniz vows to explain â€Å"how what occurs in the soul represents what occurs in the organs† (71). What he implies with this passage is that animals, just like humans, have souls which are influenced and impacted by sensory perceptions. Then, in XXVI of The Monadology, he explains that â€Å"[m]emory provides a kind of sequence in souls, which imitates reason, but which must be distinguished from it† (71). Leibniz continues, providing an example of a dog remembering abuse with a stick to suggest that animals have some form of memory or perception. As a result of the memories of abuse and a recollection of the pain, the dog flees when presented with a stick. In arguing as much, Lei... ...ecies. Since humans cannot catch prey, without the use of tools or weaponry, as efficiently as a lion, the lion could then be deemed superior. Reframing what supposedly makes man superior out of an anthropocentric view hopefully elucidate the idea that no trait makes any being superior over any other. I agree with Leibniz that a mind created in the image of God should, indeed, â€Å"act with knowledge in imitation of the divine nature† (39). This includes acting as moral agents to consider the good and inherent worth of all beings. After all, in many respects, animals and man are very similar. But, assuming human superiority is an abuse of our unique position as moral agents of God. Moreover, if we believe God has infinite and perfect virtues who acts in a divine nature, then it seems that such an omnibenevolent being would not value any creature over any other.